STANFORD LAW REVIEV/ [Vol. 36: 1485 quences worse than those produced by either system fu nctioning alone. Professor Morris' solution is to treat criminal law viola tions solely within the criminal justice sys tem. Thus, compe tence-to-stand-trial proceedings would be radically altered to permit all offenders to come to trial quickly. 1 More radical yet, Professor Morris would abolish the insanity defe nse.2 Mental disorder would be considered at trial only insofar as it negated mens rea, and at sentencing. Although Professor Morris is a leading and sophisticated advocate fo r the abolitionist position, I
believe he is nonetheless mistaken according to his own theoreti cal standards.
Let us consider our points of agreement first, however. Pro fe ssor Morris correctly notes that while the insanity defense is raised in very fe w cases, the amount of time and resources it re quires and the concern it generates are grossly disproportionate to its importance.3 The result of a successful insani ty plea-usu ally commitment to a maximum security state hospital for the criminally insane-is often less therapeutic and pleasant than a prison sentence. Moreover, some defe ndants may not raise the insanity defense or succeed at it when they should, while others who should be convicted and punished win acquittal. Further more, many disordered prisoners who did not rais e it (or did not do so successfully) , but who need treatment, do not receive it. I agree, in short, that there are many practical problems, some of which abolition would remedy.
But even if abolition is practical, is it just? This is a fa ir ques tion to ask of Professor Morris because he employs a theory of criminal sanctions that considers just deserts as well as conse-I. Pp. 44-53. I substantially agree with this proposal. More injustice is done under the current slow and psychiatrically unjustified incompetence procedures than would be created by trying incompetent defendants.
2. Although the Hinckley verdict has made it fashionable to propose abolishing the insanity defense, Professor Morris had suggested abolition long before that event. N. MoRRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HoNEST PoLITICIAN's GuiDE TO CRIME CoNTROL 176-85 (1970) ; Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 514, 516-28 (1968) .
3. As a practical matter, if a jurisdiction adopted both a reasonable partial-respon sibility variant of diminished capacity that applied to all crimes, and a fa ir and workable indeterminate sentencing scheme, an insanity defense would be necessary in very few cases. Nevertheless, as I shall argue below, the insanity defense si10uld be retained for moral reasons, even if it applies to very few cases. I also believe that a partial-responsi bility defense is unwise, see Morse, Undzminished Confusion in Dimmished Capacity, 75 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY I, 28-36 (1984) , and that a fair and workable indeterminate sentencing scheme is impossible, see notes 24-59 infra and accompanying text. quentialist results. Indeed, he directly confronts "the question of fa irness, the sense tha t it is unjust and unfair to stigmatize the mentally ill as criminals and to punish them fo r their crimes,"-! but the argument that abolition is just fa ils.
To understand why, we must first briefly address the moral fo undations of the insanity defense . It is based on general princi ples of excuse that our society considers fu ndamental. The pre conditions fo r resp onsibility for actions are that an actor be minimally rational (a cogni tive capacity) and minimally capable of self-control (a volitional capacity) . For example, infants and some demented persons are not thought to be morally guilty fo r the harms they cause precisely because they lack these capaci ties.5 Similarly, an adult who causes a harm while distraught be cause of a personal tragedy will typically be considered less responsible than if he or she had been rational and in control.
Criminal law defenses concerned wi th the defendant's conduct are based on the same principles. We excuse a defendant whose acts were the product of cognitive (e.g., infancy) or volitional (e.g., duress) circumstances that were not his fa ult.6
The question, then, is whether in some cases extreme crazi ness at the time of the offense so compromises the defendant's rationality or self-control that it would be unjust to hold him or her responsible. Professor Morris admits that there "is indeed some quite florid psychopathology [i.e,, crazy behavior] ... among those fo r whom these pleas are made . .. "7 and that it would be unjust not to mitigate their punishment,8 because, I presume, they are less responsible. These admissions concede that craziness can affect one's cognitive and volitional capacities for responsibility. If craziness can mitigate responsibility, why should it not excuse the defendant altogether in an extreme ::: ase? On what theory of responsibility can we hold accountable che small number of persons who offend under the influence of �xtreme craziness ?9 4. P. 61. 5. We may restrain such persons to prevent them fr om causing harm in the fu ture, >ut we would not consider such restraint punishment that has been imposed because it s deserved.
6. This view of human responsibility fo r action traces its long history at least back o Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE, The Nichomachean Ethics, bk. III, ch. I in INTRODUCTION TO I.RTISTOTLE 338, 385-90 (2d rev. ed. 1973). 7. P. . It is possible, of course, that Professor Morris might concede that although era- 29, 36-38 (1983) . See gener ally G. NETTLER, ExPLAINING CRIME 128-62 (2d ed. 1978) (describing the inverse correlation between social advantage and crime rates, but questioning some of the usual interpretations of these data).
held responsible fo r acts influenced by their disorder because, despite it, they are sufficien tly in control and ra tional to meet the low, threshold standards fo r responsibility.17
If the defendant was extremely irrational or out of control at the time of the offense, we do wish to know whether the defend ant was responsible fo r his or her incapacity. Thus, a defendant will not be entirely excused if his incapacity is due, fo r example, to his voluntary and knowing ingestion of a strong hallucinogen 1 8 or his fa ilure to fo llow a prescribed medical regimen. 19 But if the irrationality is the product of extreme mental disorder, over which, to the best of our knowledge, the person has little control, then the person should be entirely excused.
The mens rea approach that Professor Morris suggests-us ing evidence of mental disorder solely to negate mens rea-is not an appropriate substitute fo r the insanity defense. Even the cra ziest defendants, such as our hallucinating and deluded actor, usually have the mens rea required by the highest crime charged (they may kill with premeditated inten t, although fo r the craziest reasons).20 Very fe w defendants, no matter how disordered, will obtain conviction of a lesser offense and a reduced sentence under the mens rea approach. Moreover, conviction of a lesser offense and reduction in sentence are insufficient responses to the clear injustice that convicting obviously disordered defend ants will produce. On what adequate theory of desert can a grossly psychotic defendant receive more than the most minimal penalty, if any? Punishing a defendant more than he deserves fo r fe ar of "depreciating the seriousness of the offense" abandons any contraints desert would provide. Undeserved punishment will surely occur, however, because severely crazy defendants convicted of the most serious crimes must be given relatively sub stantial and thus disproportionately harsh penalties to avoid the depreciation effect.
In addition, convicting and punishing nonresponsible defendan ts will create disrespect fo r the criminal law on fa irness grounds if they are punished too harshly, or dis respect on consequentialist grounds if they are not punished In the remainder of this review, I will suggest that Professor
Morris provides insufficient justifications fo r (1) the general mixed theory of sentencing that leads to unequal sentences fo r defendants convicted of the same crime, and (2) the use of mental disorder and mercy to set sentences in individual cases.
Instead, I propose that better definitions of crimes and defenses, coupled with reasonable, determinate sentences, will create a more just, al though by no means perfect, system.23 To demon strate the validity of this contention, I shall conclude with a re analysis of "The Brothel Boy," the moral tale that Professor Morris uses to prove the necessity fo r exercising discretion and mercy in sentencing.
22. As Professor Morris makes clear throughout the book, desert must play an im portant role in sentencing. Moreover, in an earlier discussion of sentencing policy using Rawls' "veil of ignorance" methodology, Morris wrote that "we should ... subscribe to concepts of fa irness and justice that preclude the sacrifice of the individual prisoner to a supposed larger social good." N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 83 (1974) . These are the right sentiments, but they seem quite inconsistent with the system Profes sor Morris now proposes.
23. I should make it clear at the outset that I have no utopian expectations of a determinate sentencing scheme. As many critics have argued, determinate sentencing has a multitude of practical and theoretical problems. See, e.g., J. HEWITT & T. CLEAR, THE IMPACT OF SENTENCING REFORM: FROM INDETERMINATE TO DETERMINATE SENTENC ING (1983) . Nor do I consider indeterminate sentencing incoherent. I simply believe that a determinate scheme, despite its problems, will operate more fa irly and efficiently.
A.
Sentencing Policy
The analysis in J\1/adness and the CriminaL Law is somewhat dis cursive, perhaps reflecting the book's provenance as a series of writings on related themes .�4 The book provides no single, sys tematic statement of Morris' argument for employing ran ges of sentences and rejecting equality. Neverth eless, I believe that
Professor Morris' arg·ument rests on three related propositions, each being necessary and together all being sufficient to prove the superiority of his suggested scheme. First, desert cannot be a defining principle of punishment because it is too indeterminate.
In other words, it is impossible to claim coherently that there is a specific deserved punishment fo r each criminal offense.25 Sec ond, no one really believes in equality of sentencing anyway, be cause we all accept numerous important exceptions to equality.26
Third, parsimonious sentencing should and can be performed.
That is, society should impose the least amount of suffering con sistent with achieving our other, consequentialist social goals in punishing, a goal that is practically possible as well as just.27 Let us consider each of these contentions in order.28 25. [196] [197] [198] [199] [200] [201] [202] . Morris also claims that we must allow room fo r mercy because an absolutely evenhanded system would be harsher than our present arrangements. Pp.ISS-60. I shall consider this argument later. See notes 72-78 infra and accompanying text.
29. I shall hereafter refer to this as the "pure desert" or "desert" theory. is particularly unfa ir to use a person as a means by punishing him more harshly than similar offenders simply to set an example. If one is a desert theorist, it offends the sense of justice to punish someone not fo r what he has done, but fo r the greater good, the increased deterrence that will supposedly result. Moreover, it is by no means certain that treating people in this way will produce a net social benefit.34 A similar analysis also applies to the pro priety of amnesty and pardon.
31. For instance, a survey by "[t)he National Survey of Crime Severity found that many diverse groups of people agree about the relative severity of specific crimes." Rand, Klaus, & Taylor, The Criminal Event, in U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, supra note 16, at 4. There were some differences in how people rated the severity of various crimes-for example, crime victims assigned · generally higher "severity scores" than non-victims but people by and large agreed upon rankings. !d. For a retribution-based procedure fo r setting penalties, see Davis, How to Make the Punishment Fit the Crime, 93 ETHICS 726, 736-42 (1983) .
32. The Supreme Court has recognized that principles of fe deralism and varying state interests can produce wide and constitutionally permissible differences between severity rankings and assigned punishments for crimes among the states. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980 Finally, the exercise of discretion produced by selective en fo rcement may be an inevitable evil of our criminal justice sys tem, but I see no reason not to avoid it in sentencing. I should try drastically to limit selective enforcement at all levels of the system if the resources are availab le. It is of course true, as critics of determinate sentencing contend, that eliminating discretion at sentencing will not eliminate it at earlier points in the system .35
Nevertheless, Professor Morris' view of the criminal jus tice sys tem as a closed hydraulic model-where discretion closed off in one place must inevi tably resurface elsewhere-is unlikely to be correct.36 Nor is it likely that the appearance of equality in deter minate sentencing will lull anyone into believing that massive am ounts of arbitrary and unfair discretion no longer exist else where in the system. Most important, it is fa irer both to treat like cases alike and not to use persons as means to ends.37
Professor Morris' final and most importan t proposition sup porting inequality is that parsimonious sentencing is both just and practical . This theory has undeniable appeal because it seems to provide the best of both worlds-offenders get what they deserve, but only up to the amount necessary to achieve other worthy social ends. To implemen t his theory, Professor
Morris proposes using a range of sentences that can be imposed fo r each crime. A ran ge gives deserts their due by allowing fo r adjustments in punishment necessitated by the extraordinary di versity of fa c tors, such as mental disorder, that can affect criminal behavior but that legislative definitions cannot possibly cover. It simultaneously allows fo r the realization of consequentialist goals such as maximizing deterrence. Moreover, a range permits the granting of mercy, which humanizes punishment and enri ches the soul of the person dispensing it. Although the case for such a By contrast, few would agree to being punished more harshly because unequal punish ment would infringe upon their dignity and result in indeterminate social benefits.
35. See, e.g., Alschuler, Sentencing Refonn and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550 (1978) .
36. See id. at 577. 37. By "like cases," I mean cases that are legally alike in fitting the same category of criminal liability. Cases that are fa ctually alike may of course be treated legally differ ently through the exercise of discretion at any stage of the system. In my view, this is an abuse that we should try to correct: Cases that are fa ctually alike ought to be treated legally alike. At present, however, we have the worst of all worlds-too much arbitrary exercise of discretion at every stage.
[Vol. 36:148 5 sensible scheme seems unassailable, 38 fo r both th eoretical and practical reasons the system would be more unjust and arbitrary than a more determinate scheme, and it would not guarantee that good consequences would flow fr om the "fme-tuning" it suppos edly allows. We shall fi rst see why Professor Morris' system of parsimonious, discretionary sentencing is unfair and then turn to an examination of why it is impractical .
The primary objection to the system is that it is unfair: Per sons convicted of the same crime receive unequal punishments either fo r reas ons that have nothing to do with their crime (gen eral deterrence, fo r example) or because of mitigating or aggra vating fa ctors that lack persuasive justification and cannot be applied nonarbitrarily. Punishing unequally to achieve social goals uses defendants as means to an end, without respect fo r their dignity. Although the demands of equal jus tice may be "hazy,"39 it is insufficient simply to assert that one can distin guish between a general justification fo r punishment and the jus tification fo r its distribution in individual cases .40 One still must demonstrate that it is acceptable to treat persons as means in in dividual cases because desert sets fa ir minimal constraints on do ing so in general. Professor Morris tries to prove this by claiming that his system would not treat defendants without regard to de sert since no one would receive an undeserved punishment. This response does not succeed, as we shall see, because desert does not logically entail a range rather than a fixed sentence, and be cause morally important differences in desert cannot be nonarbi trarily distinguished among offenders to whom the range 38. Professor Morris consistently refers to indeterminate systems as "mature," in contrast, it would appear, to allegedly "immature" desert systems.
39. Pp. 40. Here, again, Professor M orris relies heavily on a distinction Professor Hart draws most influentially. Hart, supra note 39, at 8-13. As Professor Morris fears quib bling with Aristotle (who believed that justice required that like cases be treated alike), P. 180, I fe ar quibbling with Professor Hart. Nevertheless, distinguishing between the general justification fo r punishment and the justification fo r its distribution seems to me rather hazy. If a general justifying principle of punishment exists, then the treatment of individual cases should be derived from it. If both the supposed general jus tifying aim (desert) and the distributive aim (utility) are to be considered in every case, I do not understand how this differs from the usual sort of mixed theory. But see G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 418-19 ( 1978) . Professor Hart's distinction does not allow the criminal justice theorist who proposes the mixed view to avoid having to justify his position. allegedly applies. Defendants will not get their just deserts, and consequential concerns will predominate .
The criticism of indeterminacy that Professor Morris aims at determi nate sentencing can be leveled fa irly at his schem e as well, for under his scheme desert sets an upper maximum (be :.und v;hich punishment is too severe) and a 10\ver minimum (be neath which punishment is too lenient, thus depreciating the seriousness of the of-Tense) .41 Professor Morris claims that since even the most well-defined crimes cover diverse types of behav ior, only a range of not undeserved punishments can really en com pass the just desert in a given case . . 12 A hierarchy of not undeserved punishments will thus be a hierarchy of ranges of punishments.
The problem, as Morris concedes, is that there are no firm criteria fo r setting the ranges of punishments.43 Because there can be no objectively correct penal ty fo r most crimes that is "too" severe, there will be little constraint on legislative judg men t in setting the high end of the range . Moreover, if desert can vary within a range in proportion to the responsibility of the offender, it is difficult to understand why there should ever be a minimum penalty fo r any crime.44 Imagine the case of a grossly psychotic defendant who would meet any legal test fo r insanity, but under Professor Morris' scheme must be held responsible fo r the crime he committed. Such a person would be barely respon sible, even according to Morris, and one wonders why it would depreciate the seriousness of any offense, no matter how hei nous, to assert that this person deserves little if any punishment.
Everyone agrees that murder is dreadful, but I doubt that many people would consider it less dreadful if a grossly psychotic per son with the mens rea fo r murder were incarcerated on grounds of safety and therapy rather than desert. The range of punish ments for each crime may be so wide that desert will play little role, the opportunity fo r discretion will be enormous, and conse quentialist goals will be the primary determinants of sentenc- The same values and political processes that can set a fixed range of punishmen ts fo r each crime can also set a fixed punish ment for each crime. Because setting either a fixed amoun t or a range is a culturally relative outcome of a particular poli tical pro cess, indeterminancy problems exist in both cases . The range and any punishment within it will be as arbitrary as a fixed sen tence. In one sense, of course, a range is more likely to capture the "correct" pu nishment than a fixed term, but this is so only if we fo olishly believe that an objectively correct sanction exists.
In addition, Professor Morris implicitly assumes that defend ants convicted of the same crime are more morally different than alike and therefore it would be unwise to punish them alike. But contrary to his assumption, claims fo r mitigation and aggravation of penalties on moral culpability grounds are primarily based on a desire for isonomy rather than anisonomy. The primary moral reason to adjust sentences within a range is to fit punishment more precisely to desert than a determinate system would per mit. While this is a justifiable goal, it can succeed only if moral differences between offenders convicted of the same crime can accurately identify those differences_ and thus provide a nonarb i trary basis fo r differential punishment. But Professor Morris' ar gument does not sufficiently support the existence of such differences or the possibility of employing them nonarbitrarily.
All people have different endowments, histori es, problems, personalities, and so on. For purposes oflegal punishment, how ever, there is a sense in which all these differences are trivial.
When considering the criminal's responsibility, we usually fo cus on all his problems, all the criminogenic reasons why obeying the law seemed so hard for him, and why offending the law seemed so inevitable. But suppose we ask the question in reverse: How hard is it not to offend the law? The criminal law sets very low standards; it asks very little of us. Further, a sensible and careful definition of substantive crimes and defenses can take important moral differences into account. Differences in rationality and myriad other fa ctors affect whether a person offends or obeys the law. But except in extreme cases justifying a total defense such as insanity, duress, necessity, or self-defense, it is simply not that 45. Pp. 152, hard to obey.46 Neither this sort of empirical claim nor its oppo site is provable, but I believe my claim is more plausible. If so, all those defendants who do not warrant a fu ll excuse may be fa r more alike than they are different. The great value of this as sumption is that it treats people >v ith respect and dignity rather than as helpless puppets buffeted by fo rces that rob them of re sponsibility fo r their deeds. St. Peter may wish to do greater "fine tuning," but the law should not.
Another way of capturing this intuition uses the sort of "light hearted psychological reflections" Professor Morris employs.47
He assures us that prisoners , who he claims are more sensible than his Chicago Law School colleagues, would ob ject to dispa rate sentences, but that they would readily agree that at least they are all getting what they deserve.48 Suppose we tell those wise citizen-prisoners \v ho received the higher sentences that the rea son the others received lesser terms fo r the same crime was that the others were "less together" mentally because their past histo ries were tougher.49 My guess is that they would react very un pleasantly. Instead of "sensibly" and good-naturedly agreeing that, "Well, that's a good reason," my lighthearted reflective pre diction is that, outraged, they would swear profusely and claim that "Everyone's go t a story," because, in fact, everyone has.
There is simply no defendant, no matter how privileged, fo r whom a convincingly sad tale cannot be told.50 The heavily pun ished prisoners would say that they deserve the same punishment as others who committed the same crime. They are righ t: The strong norm of equality should not yield to the common and dig nity-robbing assumption that differences in responsibility among the responsible are so great.
Professor Morris is uneasy about punishing those who de serve to be punished. He is constantly seeking, on both conse quentialist and desert grounds, means to avoid punishing. We agree that no one should suffer fo r nothing, but causing people 46. See also G. FLETCHER, supra note 40, at 513-14. The discussion in the text is presented in expanded fo rm in Morse, supra note 3, at 30-36.
47. P. 201. 48. For prisoners, the problem is that all of their peers are not being punished equally. Morris contends, however, that prisoners will agree that justice does not re quire equality of punishment. !d.
49. If this seems too colloquial, let me suggest that it is every bit as scientific as what could be claimed with more technical language.
50. For a fu ll discussion of this point in the context ofusing psychodynamic formu lations to tell the mitigating story, see Morse, supra note 13, at 1027-39. Vol. 36: 1485 to suffer fo r the crimes they have committed does not offend me.
They suffer because they deserve it. It would be better if they did not have to suffer, but it would be better yet if they had not of fe nded the law. This is not an ariel, theoretical belief. Rather, it goes to the heart of what it means to be a responsible person in a world that cannot exist without vast amoums of restraint and fo r bearance towards our fe llows.
If sentences are to be acljusted within ranges set in part ac cording to culpability differences among defendants, fa irness re quires careful normative theories to tell us which fa ctors should count and how much they should weigh in the balance. Without such theories and the practical guidance they provide, the arbi trariness of applying differential sentencing will sweep away any theoretical fa irness. Professor Morris refers to systems that "take gross account of moral imperatives" as "mature," but inspecting one of his favor ite examples, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines,54 is not com-51. P. 156 (referring to the mechanisms of "understanding and self-control" in an aside not related to mental disorder).
52. E.g., pp. 159, 167, 168. 53. P. 152. Professor Morris also writes that "[A]ll we can do is to develop a rough gradation of clemency which will permit us to take some gross account of moral imperatives ." P. 156 (emphasis added) . This is a hazy prescription indeed. He is clearly ambivalent about "fine-tuning."
54. Pp. 172-76.
fo rting. In the abstract, the Guidelines are an excellent expression of the theory of indeterminate sentencing, but the ex amples Professor Morris provides of their actual use are chilling instances of the arbi trary exercise of discretion on vague gr ounds.55 Rather than providing elaborate justifications fo r mit igation and the degree of mitigation , many of the reports are sim ply conclusions that beg the ques tion to be answered: They assume that mental disorder and other fa ctors justify mitigation, but they do not show why and how this should be done.
If the law should mitigate punishment in at least some cases, I
believe there is only one fa ir sol ution: one grade of mitigation applicable to all crimes that carries a legislatively fixed reduction in sentence. In effect, there would be a new verdict of "guilty but partially responsible" that would reflect the jury's finding that the defendant committed the crime charged but that his capacity fo r self-control or rationality was substantially compromised at the time.56 This verdict would lead to the imposition of the fixed, lower sentence. This is the most "fine tuning" that can realisti cally be accomplished. It also has the virtue of enhancing equal treatment. Nevertheless, it is not the preferable solution.
In sum, Professor Morris' system would operate arbitrarily and therefore unfa irly. Although this objection should be con clusive to a desert or mixed theorist, the system might be saved by a consequentialist weighing that demonstrates that the benefi cial social outcome of the system outweighs the unfairness. I do not believe, however, that Professor Morris can make good on his promise that consequentialist balancing will create a net social gain. Assuming that desert can at best provide a hierarchy of ranges of not undeserved sentences, can we "fine tune" 291-96 (1979) . If we adopt partial responsibility as a defense-a position I reject-the scheme described in the text need not be limited to partial responsibility produced by mental abnormality. In theory, partial responsibility should be available to any defendant whose responsibil ity or blameworthiness is nonculpably compromised fo r any reason. Hence, this scheme could handle all cases that would reasonably justify mitigation. A major objection to this scheme is that juries are not the appropriate body to decide on mitigation by gross and generous weighing; the sentencing judge, it is argued, can handle this task more sensi bly. For the reasons I have given, however, the judge cannot perform this task nonarbi trarily. Thus, I prefer to leave the moral decision about mitigation to the body that decides on guilt or innocence-the jury-and I prefer that it be performed at the high visibility stage of the process, the trial, rather than at the low visibility sentencing stage. Vol. 36: 1485 sentences within the ranges in individual cases to achieve any net social benefits?
Society has a lot to do if it is to achieve social benefits in this way. Firs t, we need some measure of the costs of treating like cases diffe rently. These costs include the unfairness prisoners experience and the unfairness observers such as myself perceive.
Human lives are at stake and unjustified dispari ties resulting fr om imprecision are costly, unjust, and unacceptable. It is not sufficient to contend that the inevitable disparities will not create injustice because all prisoners, whose sentences all fa ll some where in the not undeserved range, are receiving a not unde served punishment. I think this rationalization will be scant The consequentialist weighing that Professor Morris pro poses is not possible. Many of the most important costs cannot be measured in principle. Factors that perhap s can be measured in principle cannot be adequately measured in fa ct. The applica tion of mitigating and aggravating fa ctors according to a "gross and generous weighing of fa ult" will inevitably produce arbitrary exercises of discretion. Professor Morris' apparently sensible system simply cannot achieve its supposed advantages.58 I prefer 57. See, e.g. , P. GREENWOOD & A. ABRAHAMSE, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION (1982) . 58. Professor Morris can be charmingly, disarmingly honest. Discussing a hypo thetical about sentencing, he writes that in some cases he would mitigate punishment without giving a reason in order to achieve a result he evidently thinks is more just. P. properly to consider the many gradations in these two behavioral fa ctors, it would inquire at sentencing into the degree of rational ity and self-control that the defendant possessed at the time of the offense, and adjust the punishment accordingly. Mental dis orders would occupy no special place in such an inquiry; they would be simply one fa ctor to be considered. Assessing degrees of rationality and self-control and nonarbitrarily assigning pun ishment within the range might pose insuperable practical problems, but would create no theoretical incoherence.
The problem with this fine tuning, once again, is the vision of people and the law that it presupposes. It treats people as inca pable of meeting a minimum demand of civilized society: re straining themselves sufficiently to live peaceably with others.
The opposite vision-that we are all capable of obeying the law, including most mentally disordered persons-is both possible and more respectfu l, however. The law can consider relevant moral differences in the definitions of different crimes and defenses. Al though there are diffi cult problems with using mental disor der to decrease punishment, considerations of desert cause even greater problems when used to enhance punishment. Professor Morris' consequentialist argument is theoretically sound.
Whether the defendant's mental disorder increases his danger ousness and thereby justifies longer incarceration is an empirical question that can be answered by studies that, by controlling fo r other fa ctors , allow the independent contribution of mental dis order to dangerousness to emerge . Professor Morris would not allow the presence of mental disorder to enhance punishment unless such an independent contribution to dangerousness could be demonstrated.65 This is precisely the right appro ach. But since the best evidence demonstrates that mental disorder per se rarely if ever enhances dangerousness,66 Morris' system would not allow consequentialist-based enhancement.
Professor Morris would allow enhancement of punishment, however, because "desert itself may be conditioned by fe ar, and the mentally ill may properly or improperly be more fe ared in relation to criminal behavior than those who are not mentally ill. "67 Professor Morris fu rther explains that:
The societal fa ce of a deserved punishment expresses fe ar of the criminal among other sentiments . Irrational behavior that is not easily explained or is seen as out of control tends to be more fe ared than similar behavior that is thought to be planned and rationally controlled. And that those fe ars help to define the deserved punishment . . . requires no analysis; brief intro spection in which one empathizes with the victim suffices . . . . But clearly, being generative of irrational fe ar, the criminal's mental illness tends sometimes towards increasing his punishment. 58
Contrary to Professor Morris' blithe assertion, however, these propositions are hardly clear and require careful analysis.
Putting aside considerations of mental disorder fo r a mo ment, what does it mean to say that criminals who provoke greater fe ar deserve greater punishment? Our fe ar is certainly 65. Pp. 171-72. 66 . Monahan & Steadman, supra note 17. Professor Morris claims that one can cautiously conclude that certain mental disorders increase the base expectancy rate for certain categories of crime. P. 164. Except when referring in general, and without cita tion, to "two streams of research," he cites no evidence to support this conclusion and, to the best of my knowledge, no reliable and valid studies to support it are available. greater of those who commit more serious, or fe ars ome, crimes, and this is reflected already in the rank ordering of the serious ness of crimes and punishments. Similarly, we fe ar more those who commit crimes in particularly fe arsome ways. Thus, it makes sense to say that a criminal deserves more punishment because he has done something more heinous than someone who com mitted the same crime in a less fe arsome fa shion.69
Professor Morris does not seem to have either of these two cases in mind, however. What he is apparently referring to is the case of an especially dangerous type of criminal who, because of his prior record or some other fa ctor, is likely to offend again.
Increasing such a criminal's punishment on consequentialist grounds is log·ical, but he does not deserve more punishmen t.70
He has not done anything worse than another defendant accused of the same crime; he is being punished fo r who he is rather than fo r what he has done. This is a strange meaning of desert that I doubt even Professor Morris would accept. 7 1
Professor Morris' problem becomes even greater when we consider the role of mental disorder in producing fear. Assume either that a crazy person commits a crime in a scary way or that a defendant arguably deserves more punishment because he is a scary type of person. It simply does not fo llow that some men tally disordered people deserve heightened punishment because they are especially fr ightening. The reason is that the cause of their fri ghtening irrationality-mental disorder-is beyond their control. Professor Morris accepts this claim by contending that mental disorder decreases desert. He bases this contention on the assumption that irrationality is not the fa ult of the mentally disordered. He cannot have it both ways, however. If mentally disordered people are powerless to prevent their fe arsomeness,
69. This could be dealt with by proper definitions of crimes rather than by adjust ments in sentencing.
70. Some theorists have tried to justify recidivist statutes on desert grounds. See, e.g. , von Hirsch, Desert and Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 65 MINN. L. REv. 59 1 (1981). I fi nd these arguments unpersuasive. If a person has already received the deserved pun ishment fo r what he has done, I do not see why the commission of a past crime should enhance his deserved punishment fo r fu rther deeds.
71. Professor Morris never addresses whether desert justifies considering a crimi nal's prior criminal record at sentencing. In making his case for anisonomy, however, he assumes in order to clarify the issues that such a justification exists. Pp. 184-86. The tenor of the discussion leads me to believe that he rejects the justifications given, p. 185, and would rely on his own scheme solely on the ground that creating fear produces greater desert. See p. 163.
one cannot claim that they deserve increased punishment fo r it.
Professor Morris' reference to empathy wi th the victim as a ground fo r desert-based enhancement is a final logical gaffe.
One might empathize with the victim of a rabid dog's attack, but that empathy, and fe ar of the dog, hardly lead to the conclusion that the dog "deserves " punishment. It should be cured or de stroyed, of course, but not because it is morally at fa ult.
Thus, Professor Morris must rely on consequentialist argu ments fo r increasing punishment on the basis of fe ar, especially where the fe arsomeness is a product of mental disorder. What is mercy? It is not the decrease in punishment that fo l lows fr om a finding that an offender deserves less punishment or that a lesser punishment will create a social gain, although all of Professor Morris' examples are of this standard sort. Consulting the philosophical literature does not provide definitional and conceptual clarification of the term "mercy."74 As important as the topic seems to be, the literature is sparse, and scholars rarely agree. Nor is much of the literature sufficiently specific to help practical persons like Professor Morris, who wish to affect deci sionmakers . All that remains is the commonsensical notion that to exercise mercy is to decrease a person's punishment or suffer ing beyond what the usual desert or consequentialist justifica tions would dictate; we punish less because we fe el sorry fo r the person being punished. Professor Morris claims that there is a 72. E.g. , pp. 155-60. My discussion addresses those pages unless otherwise noted. A regime of broad ranges of penalties in which judges were charged with exercising mercy in appropriate cases would be one of "no holds barred" arbitrariness. The law cannot engage in such an enterprise without compromising its legitimacy. If the need fo r mercy is compelling, then mercy must be exercised pri vately, driven by generosity of the soul. Granting mercy cannot be the law's business, and Professor Morris provides no guide lines to convince us that it should be. D. Defining Crimes and justice: "The Brothel Boy " Reconsidered Professor Morris denies the law's ability to define crimes and defenses with sufficient moral and legal precision to justif y pun ishing those convicted of the same crime alike. He therefore sug gests ranges of not undeserved sentences and must accep t all the problems they create. I believe, however, that crimes and de fe nses can be defined with sufficient precision morally to support equal punishment. Careful attention to mens rea, relevant cir-79. One might argue that the intolerably inhumane conditions in many of our jails and prisons produces the tyranny complained of. If the unfairness of exposing prison ers to such conditions, rather than the theoretically just grounds fo r punishment, is what is really at stake, society should confront this problem directly.
ST"1 NFORD LAW REVIE W [Vol. 36: 1485 cumstances, and justifying and excusing conditions can capture the important moral differences among criminals that the law should recognize. Other differences in personal characteristics and circumstances are real but not legally important. No matter how precisely crimes and defenses are defined, of course, there will occasionally be substantial differences in culpability between two defendants convicted of the same relatively precisely defined crime. In such cases, punishing the same will create, or appear to create, injustice. Less injustice will result, however, than the ar bitrary exercise of discretion that Professor Morris' system inevi tably will produce. ing mercy is a task best left to the deity. Although Dr. Veraswami is sympathetic to the boy, he views the task of the law as justice, not mercy, and here justice requires the noose.81 In the end, the brothel boy hangs .
Despite Dr. Veraswami's contentions, the reader is clearly meant to sympathize with the brothel boy, to conclude that he is not fu lly responsible fo r the girl's death , and to fe el revolted by the capital punishment. The result appears unjust, or at the very least, the case seems to demand the dispensation of mercy. The lesson of the story is that legal guilt and its predetermined pun ishments create unfair results .
I wish to commit a nasty deed upon Professor Morris' art-to treat his story as an examination hypothetical. I shall consider the story in the light of standard, modern homicide analysis, without redefining the law. If injustice was done, it is not primar ily because legal and moral guilt are in tension and mercy was improperly withheld; rather, the brothel boy was improperly con victed of a crime he did not commit. Professor Morris has stacked the deck by manipulating our responses to the brothel boy.
The brothel boy did not kill the girl intentionally or reck lessly. She hit her head accidentally while being raped. If the brothel boy is to be believed, he was not consciously aware that he was risking her death. At most, then, he is guilty of some fo rm of negligent homicide, say, involuntary manslaughter, which typi cally carries very light penalties. Would a short term of imprison ment appear to be such an unfair punishment fo r the brothel boy's deed?
Criminal lawyers might argue that the brothel boy committed fe lony murder; raping the girl supplied the underlying fe lony that caused her death. Of course, fe lony murder is a fo rm of 81. Veraswami also argues that the assistant superintendant must hang the boy because that is what both the British and the Burmese expect from a British official. This consequentialist argument based on role expectations is derived from Orwell's ob servations in Shooting an Elephant, supra note 80. There, Orwell wrote that as an officer in the Indian Imperial Police he fe lt compelled to destroy a valuable elephant that had run amok and killed a man. Although the elephant was calm and it was unnecessary to kill it, the villagers expected him to do so because his role required it. He killed the elephant.
It is impossible to know whether this incident actually happened to Orwell as he described it in the essay. This is a problem with much of Orwell's seemingly autobio graphical writing. B. CRICK, GEORGE ORWELL: A LIFE 26, 166 (l980). This is why I refer to the essay as an "autobiographical fictional essay." S. 586 (1978) . Furthermore, if the brothel boy could be convicted offelony murder, it is likely, although not certain, that the death penalty could not be constitutionally applied to him. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding that the death penalty cannot be applied to a fe lony murderer who killed entirely accidentally).
88. E.g., CAt.. PENAL CoDE § 190.3(h) (Deering 1984) . 89. The brothel boy would most likely be guilty of involuntary manslaughter, but if the jurisdiction requires subjective liability fo r that crime, he might not be guilty of any form of homicide. He might be guilty of battery if that crime could be committed negligentlY.
STANFORD LA W REVIE VV [Vol. 36: 1485 cause elsewhere he prescribes just this sort of careful attention to mens rea z,s a proper substitute fo r the insanity defense.90
Nor must we accept Burmese conditions and British law as they were then. Tensions between moral guilt and legal guilt can be resolved in two ways : by gran ting mercy when legal guilt is too harsh, or by reforming the law to avoid unjust attributions of guilt and punishment. It is preferable to try the latter approach first because definitions of crimes and defenses should accurately and specifically reflect our attributions of blameworthiness. If the criminal law is to maintain respect, we cannot postpone at tributing blameworthiness until sentencing.
Sensible definitions of crimes that pay careful attention to mens rea and specific circumstances, coupled with a humane ar ray of defenses, will allow the law to distinguish morally distinct cases. This approach clearly works in the case of "The Brothel
Boy." Diffe rences will still exist among offenders and the ways they commit their crimes, but fo r purposes of the law, offenders will be sufficiently morally alike to justify equal punishment. This will not be a perfect solution, but the law cannot achieve perfec tion. If like cases are treated alike, however, this is a good start. 90. E.g. , pp. 65-67, 70-72. It may seem that my analysis of mens rea supports Professor Morris' argument for abolishing the insanity defense. But it does not do so fo r at least two reasons. First, the case presents a highly unusual and artificial instance in which mens rea is substantially negated. Although this is possible in theory, in prac tice it virtually never happens. Morse, supra note 3, at 38-44. The reason the brothel boy presents such a strong case fo r mitigation is precisely that his abnormality vitiates his subjective mens rea, the proper touchstone of culpability. Second, as I have been arguing, if the brothel boy is sufficiently mentally abnormal, he should not be convicted of any crime at all because it is unjust to hold him responsible. � 91. On the other hand, Professor Morris often resorts to practical problems when ever a theoretical argument fa ils. This is perhaps most evident in his discussion of the insanity defense.
